CRIME, CRISIS, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

No. 039

CRIME, CRISIS, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION: THE PROGRESSIVE THESIS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY

by

Morton G. Wenger
University of Louisville

and
Thomas A. Bonomo
Milliken University

October 1978

RED FEATHER INSTITUTE


Presented at the Third Annual Conference on the Current State of Marxist Theory, Red Feather, Colorado.

 

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CRIME, CRISIS, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION:
THE PROGRESSIVE THESIS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY



The Problem.
Although it was never a major issue within either the classical or orthodox Marxist tradition, the matter of the relationship between crime and the terminal crisis of capitalism has become a topic of considerable debate within modern American radical sociology. On the face of it, there is nothing remarkable about this development; however, on occasion those theorists involved in said discussions have declared themselves to be Marxists or "Marxians," or to be operating from a Marxist or "class" perspective. At such a juncture, serious questions begin to arise. First, is the "new criminology" indeed Marxist, or does it represent an ad hoc and mechanical application of Marxist theory? While it is true that this is a metatheoretical question and of little interest or consequence in the actual world of social relations, it is linked to a second, more central matter of theory, which is itself of consequence to revolutionary practice. This second question does not arise in the context of discussions regarding the close relation between crime and capitalism--to all but the reactionary or the naive, such questions have long been settled. Rather, theoretical difficulties are generated by the reversal of the articulation between crime and capitalism wherein it is no longer capitalism which is seen to animate crime, but instead crime is seen to be a mechanism by which capitalism itself is altered and moved more rapidly toward social revolution. In another paper (Bonomo and Wenger, 1978) we explore the theoretical pitfalls of such an argument when viewed from an Orthodox Marxist perspective; in this context we wish to review these defects and move on to an empirical test of whatever plausible hypotheses may be salvaged from the "new criminology's" attempt at revolutionary theory.

Crime and Progress. There are several ways by which crime has been connected to progress toward revolution. First, there are the modern theses of the lumpenproletariat (cf. Quinney, 1977; Taylor, et al. 1973; Krisberge, 1975; Horowitz, 1972; and Humphries, 1974). In general, these positions argue that in modern capitalist society, it is the stagnant surplus population which has emerged as the revolutionary segment of the proletariat. of particular interest here is the position verbalized by Quinney (1977:90):

In this the "criminally defined" are viewed as generally being members of a particular stratum of the working class, or proletariat: the stagnant surplus population. Further, that stratum, by virtue of its disproportionate criminality, comes therefore to represent a state of consciousness seen as revolutionary; that is, progressive. However, by the time of the publication of Class, State, and Crime, Quinney had begun to back away from positions arguing the revolutionary consciousness of the criminal. That is, subjectivistic and individualistic models of the progressiveness of crime were being left behind as a relic of the "new criminology's" "radical" period and were being replaced by a more "Marxist," objectivistic, "forces of production" model. (As the first model is discussed at length in our earlier paper we will not recapitulate its analysis here.) It is this second model which we wish to elaborate in the present context.

The shift in Quinney's central thesis rests on a singular orientation toward the current (and ultimately, terminal) crisis of capitalism, originating in O'Connor's (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State. As Wright (1975) notes, three major positions exist regarding the contemporary crisis of capitalism; rising organic base of capital, the profit squeeze, and the under-consumption thesis (i.e., more machines, less human labor). The profit squeeze and the under-consumption thesis can for the most part be dismissed, each for different reasons. The profit squeeze thesis views the working and capitalist classes of a particular nation as being pitted against one another for their share of the national income. Its major shortcoming and hence reason for dismissal here, is that it does not consider the internationalization of labor and capitalist relations in general. In a sense, it operates as if Lenin's theses of imperialism had never been formulated. It should be noted as a caveat to this dismissal, however, that successful wars of national liberation may be the practice which rejuvenates this theory as valid analysis. The major problem with the under-consumption position is that it is generally considered to be a result rather than the cause of the crisis; the cause being contained within the rising organic composition of capital reflected in the rising proportion of constant capital when compared to its variable form. The rising organic composition of capital theory and the fiscal crisis of the state thesis contain no inherent contradiction. As will be explained, the financial crisis of the state increases in direct proportion to the displacement of the labor force due to the rising organic composition of capital; the state must manage and control this surplus population.

According to the fiscal crisis of the state thesis (O'Connor, 1973) the most critical problem of advanced capitalism is its dependence upon the state's performance of two contradictory functions, legitimation of the capitalist system and assisting in the accumulation of capital. The contradiction being that as the state assists in accumulation, legitimation suffers inversely and vice versa. In Quinney's words (1977:116):

In summary, the surplus population grows, is increasingly pauperized, and reacts with various forms of crime thereto; in response, repressive actions (crime control) must increase and pacification (social welfare) measures must be expanded in order to control the under- or unemployed segment who are relegated to the ranks of the surplus population. But, in order to control these sectors and make the control seem legitimate, money must be withdrawn from social capital (military hardware, space programs, etc.) and social investment (e.g., unemployment insurance, educational benefits, which generally lower the reproduction costs of labor); expenses which are at least indirectly and sometimes directly productive for capital. The rising crime rate is, presumably, produced by the continual displacement of the work force to a surplus population status. A certain sub-set of this population, as is always the case, resorts to crimes of property, etc., or reacts with personal pathology. Thus, the lumpenproletariat grows. These individuals engage in criminal behavior due to their poverty and the state must then invest more money in control measures to deal with this. The eventual outcome is the bankruptcy of the state and the capitalist economic system. This outcome is said to be progressive in that the conditions for social revolution therefore exist. Partial confirmation of this overall thesis is provided by the current imbroglio over taxation, which ultimately reduces to competition between the state and private or "monopoly" capital over surplus value.

Even though most lumpenproletariat crimes are of an accommodating nature and a form of false consciousness characterized by egoism and an apolitical nature, Quinney (1974:54) suggests that "...these actions occur within the context of capitalist production... the crimes are nevertheless antagonistic to the capitalist order." Quinney as well as Werkenstein (1974) agree that crude, unconscious predatory criminal acts play an inherently progressive role in revolutionary change. These theses are logically impeccable--our argument here is not one of structural inadequacy. That which we do question is hinted at by the fact that at no point in his work does O'Connor suggest that crime control makes a significant contribution to the fiscal crisis of the state; however, he does emphasize repeatedly the role of social welfare programs. We wish to test here a set of closely related propositions emerging from Quinney's application of O'Connor.

Crime and Fiscal Crisis. If crime is objectively progressive--if it does indeed place intolerable stress on the capitalist system, it does so by maximizing the expenditure of state funds on its control. This is the crux of O'Connor's thesis of social contradiction and it is an attractive position. In the case of social welfare expenditures, the data to be presented here confirm O'Connor's position. This is not surprising as O'Connor uses the same information as we do to test his position. When similar information regarding crime is examined, Quinney's thesis fares much worse; in fact, far worse than we had anticipated.

In terms of gross expenditures (Table 1, Fig. 1), in 1975 over 250 billion dollars more was diverted to social welfare than to crime control. This, it should be noted, refers to total expenditures by a levels of state administration. The significance of this is that a substantial difference exists in the level at which governmental expenditures originate--national funding is the norm in social welfare expenditures while local funding is common in crime control. Although this began to change in the mid-1960's, our data indicates that there was no relative change in funding levels as a result of that change.

Table 1: EXPENDITURES ON CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL WELFARE, ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, U.S.A., 1954-1975 (S.A.U.S.).

YEAR CRIME CONTROL (BILLIONS$) % INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR SOCIAL WELFARE (BILLIONS$) % INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR GNP (BILLIONS$) % GNP CRIME CONTROL % GNP SOCIAL WELFARE RATIO OF CRIME CONTROL TO SOCIAL WELFARE

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
2.080
2.231
2.434
2.655
2.861
3.149
3.349
3.613
3.795
4.009
4.222
4.574
4.903
5.424
6.070
7.340
8.571
10.513
11.721
13.051
14.954
17.249
---
7.3%
9.1%
9.1%
7.8%
10.1%
6.4%
7.9%
5.0%
5.6%
5.3%
8.3%
7.2%
10.6%
11.9%
20.9%
16.8%
22.3%
15.4%
11.3%
14.6%
15.3%
29.547
32.640
35.131
39.350
45.457
49.821
52.293
58.236
62.659
66.766
71.491
77.175
88.000
99.710
113.840
127.149
145.893
171.983
191.414
214.390
239.303
286.547
---
10.5%
7.7%
12.0%
15.5%
9.7%
4.8%
11.5%
7.6%
6.6%
7.1%
8.0%
14.1%
13.3%
14.2%
12.4%
14.1%
17.9%
11.7%
12.0%
11.7%
19.8%
364.8
398.0
419.2
441.1
447.3
483.7
503.7
520.1
560.3
590.5
632.4
684.9
749.9
793.9
864.2
930.3
977.1
1063.4
1173.4
1306.6
1413.2
1516.3
.5%
.5%
.5%
.6%
.6%
.6%
.6%
.7%
.7%
.7%
.6%
.6%
.6%
.7%
.7%
.8%
.9%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.1%
1.1%
8.1%
8.2%
8.4%
8.8%
8.8%
10.3%
10.4%
11.2%
11.2%
11.3%
11.3%
11.3%
11.7%
12.6%
13.2%
13.7%
14.9%
16.2%
16.3%
16.4%
16.9%
18.9%
.07
.07
.07
.07
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.05
.05
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06


Another crucial component of the fiscal crisis thesis is the rise in state expenditures which aggravates capitalism's more fundamental problems of the increasing organic composition of capital and the declining rate of profit. That is, state expenditures must become not merely a problem, but a continually exacerbating problem. As Table 1 and Figure 2 indicate, in terms of the percent rise in gross expenditures in current dollars, this is the case for both crime control and social welfare measures. However, the relative significance of this increase is in part obscured by the fact that a percent increase in crime control in 1975 represents 170 million dollars in additional expenditures while an equivalent rise in social welfare expenditures represents 2.9 billion dollars. Thus, the economic "inertia" which has to be overcome for social welfare funding to rise is much greater than that required for an equivalent rise in crime control expenditures. It is also noteworthy that during the twenty-one year period covered by this study, in only nine did the percent rise in crime control expenditures exceed that of social welfare.

In terms of the relative magnitude of expenditures in the two sectors, there is a pronounced consistency, almost to the point of indicating a sociological constant. As is seen in Table 1 and Figure 3, the ratio of crime control to social welfare expenditures varies smoothly from .05 to .07. Further, as to the argument for a rising significance for crime control expenditures, the relative magnitude of the two actually diminishes until 1968 when it begins to rise again. 1

Perhaps the most telling arguments regarding crime and the fiscal crisis of the state emerge when expenditures are standardized against Gross National Product (Table 1, Fig. 4). First, the relative insignificance of crime control emerges--it never rises much above 1% of GNP. As opposed to this, social welfare expenditures represent almost 19% of GNP in 1975. Further, in aggregate, crime control expenditures rise a total of 0.6% of GNP from 1954 to 1975; on the other hand, social welfare funding rises 10.8% of GNP, which is perhaps the most telling figure of all. In the face of all this, it is clear why O'Connor neglects to discuss crime in the context of fiscal crisis. Less clear is the reasoning by which Quinney (1977) justifies bringing it onto the agenda of Marxist analysis.

The result of all of this is an unequivocal rejection of the position that crime has an objectively progressive role to play in the demise of the capitalist epoch. That is, by its variable presence as a total social phenomenon it has no unmediated effect on the contradictions of capitalist economic organization. In our related paper (Bonomo and Wenger, 1978), we argue that the model of a subjectively progressive criminal social category in capitalism is certainly not Marxist, albeit no inarguable facts are placed in evidence by either the proponents of this position nor ourselves that can definitely resolve this matter as an empirical question. It is our position that while it may be possible to assert that criminalization is a "radicalizing" process, it is less certain that criminals come to a radical "class" perspective, or that they play a vanguard role within the surplus population, or ultimately that they are, per se, directly coterminous with any class or sub-class. Once again, these matters have been and will be discussed in detail elsewhere. Of interest here is one final variant of the thesis of the objectively progressive role of crime--the thesis of delegitimation. However, unlike the fiscal crisis thesis which looks for the objective consequences of objective social realities, delegitimation models seek the subjective consequences of these same social realities.

Crime and Delegitimation. The application of the delegitimation thesis to the phenomenon of crime represents an interesting fusion of that which we.have labeled "subjectivistic" and "objectivistic" approaches. In its most general form and as it is developed by Habermas (1975), the idea of legitimacy crisis argues that the helplessness of late capitalism in the face of its burgeoning contradictions presents it with an ideological dilemma of vast proportions. Habermas goes on to argue, with no little amount of obscurity, that the management of this crisis becomes more and more a major activity of the bourgeoisie. While this is a proposition testable within the general framework developed here, we do not do so. Instead, we wish to explore in brief certain theoretical issues which may suggest profitable paths for future exploration.

First, criminality and legitimation crises are potentially commensurable phenomena. If bourgeois sociology, political science, and survey research are to be believed, one of the major concerns of all sectors of the American proletariat is criminal predation. Whether or to what extent this reflects an accurate view of the problems of capitalism is not at issue--perceptions are. Associated with the fear of criminal victimization is a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the system euphemistically called "criminal justice." If these data exhausted those available, the marriage of crime and delegitimation would seem to flow naturally from the increasing helplessness of the state in the face of crime. Further, as certain "radical" positions would have it, an increasingly desperate state would have to turn to increasingly draconian measures of crime control, thus calling into question the nature of bourgeois liberal democracy. Assuming that social mechanisms such as the increasing segregation of surplus population fail to stem the exposure of labor aristocrats to victimization and also assuming that members of oppressed nationalities see crime as less inimical to their existence than its control (both empirically questionable postulates), it would seem that these possibilities are quite real. However, the problem at hand is not merely one of whether crime in fact does serve to delegitimate the capitalist system; it is also a question of the sequelae of such delegitimation assuming it does occur. In other words, does delegitimation by crime lead to progressive revolutionary consciousness on the part of the proletariat, or does it lead elsewhere, to less desirable outcomes?

At the most general level, the question being developed here can be expressed as a question of form and essence. Is "delegitimation" isomorphic regardless of its origin, or does it vary in nature according to the form it takes? Specifically, is delegitimation by crime equivalent to delegitimation by depression? By interminable and ultimately lost wars? By the abandonment of the aged? It is our position that an affirmative response to such questions is at least premature and most likely incorrect. Horowitz (1972), who is himself enamored of the thesis of the revolutionary lumpenproletariat, provides an ominous indication of the response to be expected from First World proletariats and proletarians in the instance of a state impotent in the face of rising criminality (Horowitz, 1972:xvii):

As Horowitz implies, the "non-surplus" sectors of the proletariat tend towards intra- not inter-class warfare as the result of state impotence. The "solution" that grows out of such delegitimation cannot be stated with certainty to be the progressive revolution of socialism, but rather shares kinship with the reactionary quasi-revolution of fascism. An argument can be made that any of the above listed sources of delegitimation could produce either outcome; the problem is that in the instance of criminal delegitimation, the source of failure is seen to emerge from within the proletariat, not from without. This impresses us as a poor jumping-off place for a revolution which culminates in a socialist society.

There are theoretical grounds within classical Marxist thought which justify caution as to the progressive nature of crime, even when seen as the agent of delegitimation. To see delegitimacy as an end in and of itself, without concern for its immediate consequences is "infantilism" in the sense that Lenin used the term; it is also primitive when seen from the perspective of Lenin's revolutionary adversary, Rosa Luxemburg. As Luxemburg (1971) noted throughout her work's, but particularly in Reform or Revolution, the end of capitalism and the advent of socialism are discreet phenomena connected by the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. Drawing on some of the deeper currents in Marx, Luxemburg asserts that the alternative to socialism is barbarism; only naive historicists and vulgar materialists deny this plurality of outcomes. The "aufhebung" of revolution is not foreordained; revolutionary failure results in a ghastly and degenerate social order (as the irony of history was to reveal in Luxemburg's own case). If historical examples are desired, the Iberian Peninsula from 1930-1975 is an excellent instance, as is Chile. To be sure, there are those cold-blooded optimists who mimic the German Communist Party of the early Nazi era which, when faced with fascist victory, developed the slogan "Nach Hitler, Uns" (After Hitler, Us). They are far more sanguine about fascist "iterregna" than are we.

Conclusion. It is true that crime is not "subjectively" progressive, and if it is true that it is not "objectively" progressive, what then is it? What is its social significance in a decadent and overripe capitalist society? As was noted earlier, one possibility may yet save radical criminology; one relationship may yet remain that salvages the lumpenproletariat for Revolution--that is the matter of "delegitimation" and its consequences. Assuming on the basis of inconclusive evidence that it does not move the criminal to the ranks of the progressive, what then remains of "Marxist" criminologies and their "new" and "radical" variants? We believe that the answer to this question is complex.

On the one hand, Marxist analyses of law, of criminogenesis, of penology are all beneficial to the destruction of bourgeois ideological hegemony. However, as Marx instructs, we must go beyond Ruge--to be sure, we must "relentlessly criticize all things"--however, we must also transcend that criticism for the purpose of changing that which we criticize. At the level of practice, our findings raise some serious doubts any revolutionary program that fails to treat "egoist crimes of accommodation" from the perspective of the prey, and expresses overt sympathy with the predator. Although much theoretical ground in the study of victimization has been ceded to bourgeois ideologues without a fight, this tactical error is not necessarily final. Certainly, the results of such an endeavor are discomfiting to the Marxist--a picture of the socially oppressed exploiting the individually helpless. The posture of the true revolutionary has never been one of cynicism nor, for that matter, has it been that of the ostrich. To equate rapists and the looters of tenement mail-boxes with Zapata is an ideological crudity of great magnitude.

Finally, the question must arise as to why this political elevation of the "scum of all classes" has occurred. To answer this is undoubtedly speculative; however, an answer--albeit an unpleasant one--does present itself. Given the existence of nationally distinctive "internal colonies" of super-exploited proletarians within mature capitalist societies, it is obvious that criminogenesis will not be randomly distributed throughout the class structure of such societies. The outcome of this is that hoary observation that certain nationalities come to be criminalized disproportionately even to the point where they may predominate among the criminal population. While this reality represents an indictment of capitalist social structure and its various national chauvinisms, it is not an excuse for the startling transposition witnessed here. It is not sufficient to explain a shift wherein the progressive, even vanguard potential of national minorities is exchanged for a chimerical revolution of thieves, albeit thieves spawned by that self-same class oppression. To look to the prisons for revolution when the assembly plants and fields of capitalism are populated in equal disproportion by the same nationalities found in those jails is to commit an error not of Marxism, but rather one entirely outside of it. Unfortunately, as is always the case, an error of revolutionary theory is never an error merely of theory.



REFERENCES

Habermas, Jurgen. 1975 Legitimation Crisis. Beacon: Boston.

O'Connor, James. 1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State. St. Martin's Press. N.Y.

Quinney, Richard. 1977 Class, State, and Crime. D. McKay Co. N.Y.

Taylor, Ian, Paul Walton, and Jock Young. 1973 The New Criminology. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

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Footnotes

1. Indeed, it is during the years around 1968 when many of the impressions upon which the new criminology are based were formed. Whether the errors of the perspective are due to a limited historical field of vision is a matter for subsequent discussion. Return



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