No. 039 CRIME, CRISIS, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION: THE PROGRESSIVE THESIS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY by Morton G. WengerUniversity of Louisville and Thomas A. Bonomo Milliken University October 1978 RED FEATHER INSTITUTE
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CRIME, CRISIS, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION:
THE PROGRESSIVE THESIS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY
The Problem. Although it was never a major issue within
either the classical or orthodox Marxist tradition, the matter of the relationship between
crime and the terminal crisis of capitalism has become a topic of considerable debate
within modern American radical sociology. On the face of it, there is nothing remarkable
about this development; however, on occasion those theorists involved in said discussions
have declared themselves to be Marxists or "Marxians," or to be operating from a
Marxist or "class" perspective. At such a juncture, serious questions begin to
arise. First, is the "new criminology" indeed Marxist, or does it represent an ad
hoc and mechanical application of Marxist theory? While it is true that this is a
metatheoretical question and of little interest or consequence in the actual world of
social relations, it is linked to a second, more central matter of theory, which is itself
of consequence to revolutionary practice. This second question does not arise in the
context of discussions regarding the close relation between crime and capitalism--to all
but the reactionary or the naive, such questions have long been settled. Rather,
theoretical difficulties are generated by the reversal of the articulation between crime
and capitalism wherein it is no longer capitalism which is seen to animate crime, but
instead crime is seen to be a mechanism by which capitalism itself is altered and moved
more rapidly toward social revolution. In another paper (Bonomo and Wenger, 1978) we
explore the theoretical pitfalls of such an argument when viewed from an Orthodox Marxist
perspective; in this context we wish to review these defects and move on to an empirical
test of whatever plausible hypotheses may be salvaged from the "new
criminology's" attempt at revolutionary theory.
Crime and Progress. There are several ways by which
crime has been connected to progress toward revolution. First, there are the modern theses
of the lumpenproletariat (cf. Quinney, 1977; Taylor, et al. 1973; Krisberge, 1975;
Horowitz, 1972; and Humphries, 1974). In general, these positions argue that in modern
capitalist society, it is the stagnant surplus population which has emerged as the
revolutionary segment of the proletariat. of particular interest here is the position
verbalized by Quinney (1977:90):
A critical question necessarily being raised in an emerging Marxist analysis of crime involves the consciousness of those who are defined as criminal... Questions about the political consciousness of the criminally defined are thus part of the larger issue of the development of political consciousness among an increasing fraction of the working class.
In this the "criminally defined" are viewed as
generally being members of a particular stratum of the working class, or proletariat: the
stagnant surplus population. Further, that stratum, by virtue of its disproportionate
criminality, comes therefore to represent a state of consciousness seen as revolutionary;
that is, progressive. However, by the time of the publication of Class, State, and
Crime, Quinney had begun to back away from positions arguing the revolutionary
consciousness of the criminal. That is, subjectivistic and individualistic models of the
progressiveness of crime were being left behind as a relic of the "new
criminology's" "radical" period and were being replaced by a more
"Marxist," objectivistic, "forces of production" model. (As the first
model is discussed at length in our earlier paper we will not recapitulate its analysis
here.) It is this second model which we wish to elaborate in the present context.
The shift in Quinney's central thesis rests on a singular orientation toward the current
(and ultimately, terminal) crisis of capitalism, originating in O'Connor's (1973) The
Fiscal Crisis of the State. As Wright (1975) notes, three major positions exist
regarding the contemporary crisis of capitalism; rising organic base of capital, the
profit squeeze, and the under-consumption thesis (i.e., more machines, less human labor).
The profit squeeze and the under-consumption thesis can for the most part be dismissed,
each for different reasons. The profit squeeze thesis views the working and capitalist
classes of a particular nation as being pitted against one another for their share of the
national income. Its major shortcoming and hence reason for dismissal here, is that it
does not consider the internationalization of labor and capitalist relations in general.
In a sense, it operates as if Lenin's theses of imperialism had never been formulated. It
should be noted as a caveat to this dismissal, however, that successful wars of
national liberation may be the practice which rejuvenates this theory as valid analysis.
The major problem with the under-consumption position is that it is generally considered
to be a result rather than the cause of the crisis; the cause being contained within the
rising organic composition of capital reflected in the rising proportion of constant
capital when compared to its variable form. The rising organic composition of capital
theory and the fiscal crisis of the state thesis contain no inherent contradiction. As
will be explained, the financial crisis of the state increases in direct proportion to the
displacement of the labor force due to the rising organic composition of capital; the
state must manage and control this surplus population.
According to the fiscal crisis of the state thesis (O'Connor, 1973) the most critical
problem of advanced capitalism is its dependence upon the state's performance of two
contradictory functions, legitimation of the capitalist system and assisting in the
accumulation of capital. The contradiction being that as the state assists in
accumulation, legitimation suffers inversely and vice versa. In Quinney's words
(1977:116):
State expenditures on criminal justice do not directly contribute to the accumulation of private capital and creation of surplus value. Rather, the criminal justice system secures the capitalist order so that the capitalist class can continue to accumulate capital. The crisis, however, becomes a fiscal one: state expenditures on criminal justice grow faster than the revenues available to support and expanding criminal justice system.
In summary, the surplus population grows, is increasingly
pauperized, and reacts with various forms of crime thereto; in response, repressive
actions (crime control) must increase and pacification (social welfare) measures must be
expanded in order to control the under- or unemployed segment who are relegated to the
ranks of the surplus population. But, in order to control these sectors and make the
control seem legitimate, money must be withdrawn from social capital (military hardware,
space programs, etc.) and social investment (e.g., unemployment insurance, educational
benefits, which generally lower the reproduction costs of labor); expenses which are at
least indirectly and sometimes directly productive for capital. The rising crime rate is,
presumably, produced by the continual displacement of the work force to a surplus
population status. A certain sub-set of this population, as is always the case, resorts to
crimes of property, etc., or reacts with personal pathology. Thus, the lumpenproletariat
grows. These individuals engage in criminal behavior due to their poverty and the state
must then invest more money in control measures to deal with this. The eventual outcome is
the bankruptcy of the state and the capitalist economic system. This outcome is said to be
progressive in that the conditions for social revolution therefore exist. Partial
confirmation of this overall thesis is provided by the current imbroglio over taxation,
which ultimately reduces to competition between the state and private or
"monopoly" capital over surplus value.
Even though most lumpenproletariat crimes are of an accommodating nature and a form of
false consciousness characterized by egoism and an apolitical nature, Quinney (1974:54)
suggests that "...these actions occur within the context of capitalist production...
the crimes are nevertheless antagonistic to the capitalist order." Quinney as well as
Werkenstein (1974) agree that crude, unconscious predatory criminal acts play an
inherently progressive role in revolutionary change. These theses are logically
impeccable--our argument here is not one of structural inadequacy. That which we do
question is hinted at by the fact that at no point in his work does O'Connor
suggest that crime control makes a significant contribution to the fiscal crisis of the
state; however, he does emphasize repeatedly the role of social welfare programs. We wish
to test here a set of closely related propositions emerging from Quinney's application of
O'Connor.
Crime and Fiscal Crisis. If crime is objectively
progressive--if it does indeed place intolerable stress on the capitalist system, it does
so by maximizing the expenditure of state funds on its control. This is the crux of
O'Connor's thesis of social contradiction and it is an attractive position. In the case of
social welfare expenditures, the data to be presented here confirm O'Connor's position.
This is not surprising as O'Connor uses the same information as we do to test his
position. When similar information regarding crime is examined, Quinney's thesis fares
much worse; in fact, far worse than we had anticipated.
In terms of gross expenditures (Table 1, Fig. 1),
in 1975 over 250 billion dollars more was diverted to social welfare than to crime
control. This, it should be noted, refers to total expenditures by a levels of state
administration. The significance of this is that a substantial difference exists in the
level at which governmental expenditures originate--national funding is the norm in social
welfare expenditures while local funding is common in crime control. Although this began
to change in the mid-1960's, our data indicates that there was no relative change in
funding levels as a result of that change.
Table 1: EXPENDITURES ON CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL WELFARE, ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, U.S.A., 1954-1975 (S.A.U.S.). | ||||||||
YEAR | CRIME CONTROL (BILLIONS$) | % INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR | SOCIAL WELFARE (BILLIONS$) | % INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR | GNP (BILLIONS$) | % GNP CRIME CONTROL | % GNP SOCIAL WELFARE | RATIO OF CRIME CONTROL TO SOCIAL WELFARE |
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 |
2.080 2.231 2.434 2.655 2.861 3.149 3.349 3.613 3.795 4.009 4.222 4.574 4.903 5.424 6.070 7.340 8.571 10.513 11.721 13.051 14.954 17.249 |
--- 7.3% 9.1% 9.1% 7.8% 10.1% 6.4% 7.9% 5.0% 5.6% 5.3% 8.3% 7.2% 10.6% 11.9% 20.9% 16.8% 22.3% 15.4% 11.3% 14.6% 15.3% |
29.547 32.640 35.131 39.350 45.457 49.821 52.293 58.236 62.659 66.766 71.491 77.175 88.000 99.710 113.840 127.149 145.893 171.983 191.414 214.390 239.303 286.547 |
--- 10.5% 7.7% 12.0% 15.5% 9.7% 4.8% 11.5% 7.6% 6.6% 7.1% 8.0% 14.1% 13.3% 14.2% 12.4% 14.1% 17.9% 11.7% 12.0% 11.7% 19.8% |
364.8 398.0 419.2 441.1 447.3 483.7 503.7 520.1 560.3 590.5 632.4 684.9 749.9 793.9 864.2 930.3 977.1 1063.4 1173.4 1306.6 1413.2 1516.3 |
.5% .5% .5% .6% .6% .6% .6% .7% .7% .7% .6% .6% .6% .7% .7% .8% .9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% |
8.1% 8.2% 8.4% 8.8% 8.8% 10.3% 10.4% 11.2% 11.2% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 11.7% 12.6% 13.2% 13.7% 14.9% 16.2% 16.3% 16.4% 16.9% 18.9% |
.07 .07 .07 .07 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .05 .05 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 .06 |
Another crucial component of the fiscal crisis thesis is the rise in
state expenditures which aggravates capitalism's more fundamental problems of the
increasing organic composition of capital and the declining rate of profit. That is, state
expenditures must become not merely a problem, but a continually exacerbating problem. As
Table 1 and Figure 2 indicate, in terms of the percent rise in gross
expenditures in current dollars, this is the case for both crime control and social
welfare measures. However, the relative significance of this increase is in part obscured by
the fact that a percent increase in crime control in 1975 represents 170 million dollars
in additional expenditures while an equivalent rise in social welfare expenditures
represents 2.9 billion dollars. Thus, the economic "inertia" which has to be
overcome for social welfare funding to rise is much greater than that required for an
equivalent rise in crime control expenditures. It is also noteworthy that during the
twenty-one year period covered by this study, in only nine did the percent rise in crime
control expenditures exceed that of social welfare.
In terms of the relative magnitude of expenditures in the two sectors,
there is a pronounced consistency, almost to the point of indicating a sociological
constant. As is seen in Table 1 and Figure 3, the ratio of crime control to social welfare
expenditures varies smoothly from .05 to .07. Further, as to the argument for a rising
significance for crime control expenditures, the relative magnitude of the two actually diminishes
until 1968 when it begins to rise again. 1
Perhaps the most telling arguments regarding crime and the
fiscal crisis of the state emerge when expenditures are standardized against Gross
National Product (Table 1, Fig. 4). First, the relative insignificance
of crime control emerges--it never rises much above 1% of GNP. As opposed to this, social
welfare expenditures represent almost 19% of GNP in 1975. Further, in aggregate, crime
control expenditures rise a total of 0.6% of GNP from 1954 to 1975; on the other hand,
social welfare funding rises 10.8% of GNP, which is perhaps the most telling figure of
all. In the face of all this, it is clear why O'Connor neglects to discuss crime in the
context of fiscal crisis. Less clear is the reasoning by which Quinney (1977) justifies
bringing it onto the agenda of Marxist analysis.
The result of all of this is an unequivocal rejection of the position that crime has an
objectively progressive role to play in the demise of the capitalist epoch. That is, by
its variable presence as a total social phenomenon it has no unmediated effect on the
contradictions of capitalist economic organization. In our related paper (Bonomo and
Wenger, 1978), we argue that the model of a subjectively progressive criminal social
category in capitalism is certainly not Marxist, albeit no inarguable facts are placed in
evidence by either the proponents of this position nor ourselves that can definitely
resolve this matter as an empirical question. It is our position that while it may be
possible to assert that criminalization is a "radicalizing" process, it is less
certain that criminals come to a radical "class" perspective, or that they play
a vanguard role within the surplus population, or ultimately that they are, per se, directly
coterminous with any class or sub-class. Once again, these matters have been and will be
discussed in detail elsewhere. Of interest here is one final variant of the thesis of the
objectively progressive role of crime--the thesis of delegitimation. However, unlike the
fiscal crisis thesis which looks for the objective consequences of objective social
realities, delegitimation models seek the subjective consequences of these same
social realities.
Crime and Delegitimation. The application of the
delegitimation thesis to the phenomenon of crime represents an interesting fusion of that
which we.have labeled "subjectivistic" and "objectivistic" approaches.
In its most general form and as it is developed by Habermas (1975), the idea of legitimacy
crisis argues that the helplessness of late capitalism in the face of its burgeoning
contradictions presents it with an ideological dilemma of vast proportions. Habermas goes
on to argue, with no little amount of obscurity, that the management of this crisis
becomes more and more a major activity of the bourgeoisie. While this is a proposition
testable within the general framework developed here, we do not do so. Instead, we wish to
explore in brief certain theoretical issues which may suggest profitable paths for future
exploration.
First, criminality and legitimation crises are potentially commensurable phenomena. If
bourgeois sociology, political science, and survey research are to be believed, one of the
major concerns of all sectors of the American proletariat is criminal predation. Whether
or to what extent this reflects an accurate view of the problems of capitalism is not at
issue--perceptions are. Associated with the fear of criminal victimization is a certain
amount of dissatisfaction with the system euphemistically called "criminal
justice." If these data exhausted those available, the marriage of crime and
delegitimation would seem to flow naturally from the increasing helplessness of the state
in the face of crime. Further, as certain "radical" positions would have it, an
increasingly desperate state would have to turn to increasingly draconian measures of
crime control, thus calling into question the nature of bourgeois liberal democracy.
Assuming that social mechanisms such as the increasing segregation of surplus population
fail to stem the exposure of labor aristocrats to victimization and also assuming that
members of oppressed nationalities see crime as less inimical to their existence than its
control (both empirically questionable postulates), it would seem that these possibilities
are quite real. However, the problem at hand is not merely one of whether crime in fact
does serve to delegitimate the capitalist system; it is also a question of the sequelae
of such delegitimation assuming it does occur. In other words, does delegitimation by
crime lead to progressive revolutionary consciousness on the part of the proletariat, or
does it lead elsewhere, to less desirable outcomes?
At the most general level, the question being developed here can be expressed as a
question of form and essence. Is "delegitimation" isomorphic regardless of its
origin, or does it vary in nature according to the form it takes? Specifically, is
delegitimation by crime equivalent to delegitimation by depression? By interminable and
ultimately lost wars? By the abandonment of the aged? It is our position that an
affirmative response to such questions is at least premature and most likely incorrect.
Horowitz (1972), who is himself enamored of the thesis of the revolutionary
lumpenproletariat, provides an ominous indication of the response to be expected from
First World proletariats and proletarians in the instance of a state impotent in the face
of rising criminality (Horowitz, 1972:xvii):
Certainly, the newest, and most dynamic factor in United States development during the Sixties was the sharp cleavage, indeed the class war situation which developed between the organized working classes and the marginal lower classes. The combatants in this decade are not the historical enemies described by Marx but are more similar to enemies defined by fascist doctrines of the state. The working class has turned to the Leviathan with a vengeance. Not the liquidation of the state but its celebration, has become of crucial importance. The working class demands legitimacy, law, order, and a ruling class willing and capable of exercising full authority. Social radicalism in American life has become the province of the reviled lumpenproletariat and their intellectual underwriters. This development, shocking to classical ideologists, must rank as the most significant political event within the first world.
As Horowitz implies, the "non-surplus" sectors of the
proletariat tend towards intra- not inter-class warfare as the result of state impotence.
The "solution" that grows out of such delegitimation cannot be stated with
certainty to be the progressive revolution of socialism, but rather shares kinship with
the reactionary quasi-revolution of fascism. An argument can be made that any of the above
listed sources of delegitimation could produce either outcome; the problem is that in the
instance of criminal delegitimation, the source of failure is seen to emerge from within
the proletariat, not from without. This impresses us as a poor jumping-off place for a
revolution which culminates in a socialist society.
There are theoretical grounds within classical Marxist thought which justify caution as to
the progressive nature of crime, even when seen as the agent of delegitimation. To see
delegitimacy as an end in and of itself, without concern for its immediate consequences is
"infantilism" in the sense that Lenin used the term; it is also primitive when
seen from the perspective of Lenin's revolutionary adversary, Rosa Luxemburg. As Luxemburg
(1971) noted throughout her work's, but particularly in Reform or Revolution, the
end of capitalism and the advent of socialism are discreet phenomena connected by the
revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. Drawing on some of the deeper currents in
Marx, Luxemburg asserts that the alternative to socialism is barbarism; only naive
historicists and vulgar materialists deny this plurality of outcomes. The
"aufhebung" of revolution is not foreordained; revolutionary failure results in
a ghastly and degenerate social order (as the irony of history was to reveal in
Luxemburg's own case). If historical examples are desired, the Iberian Peninsula from
1930-1975 is an excellent instance, as is Chile. To be sure, there are those cold-blooded
optimists who mimic the German Communist Party of the early Nazi era which, when faced
with fascist victory, developed the slogan "Nach Hitler, Uns" (After Hitler,
Us). They are far more sanguine about fascist "iterregna" than are we.
Conclusion. It is true that crime is not "subjectively"
progressive, and if it is true that it is not "objectively" progressive,
what then is it? What is its social significance in a decadent and overripe capitalist
society? As was noted earlier, one possibility may yet save radical criminology; one
relationship may yet remain that salvages the lumpenproletariat for Revolution--that is
the matter of "delegitimation" and its consequences. Assuming on the basis of
inconclusive evidence that it does not move the criminal to the ranks of the progressive,
what then remains of "Marxist" criminologies and their "new" and
"radical" variants? We believe that the answer to this question is complex.
On the one hand, Marxist analyses of law, of criminogenesis, of penology are all
beneficial to the destruction of bourgeois ideological hegemony. However, as Marx
instructs, we must go beyond Ruge--to be sure, we must "relentlessly criticize all
things"--however, we must also transcend that criticism for the purpose of changing
that which we criticize. At the level of practice, our findings raise some serious doubts
any revolutionary program that fails to treat "egoist crimes of accommodation"
from the perspective of the prey, and expresses overt sympathy with the predator. Although
much theoretical ground in the study of victimization has been ceded to bourgeois
ideologues without a fight, this tactical error is not necessarily final. Certainly, the
results of such an endeavor are discomfiting to the Marxist--a picture of the socially
oppressed exploiting the individually helpless. The posture of the true revolutionary has
never been one of cynicism nor, for that matter, has it been that of the ostrich. To
equate rapists and the looters of tenement mail-boxes with Zapata is an ideological
crudity of great magnitude.
Finally, the question must arise as to why this political elevation of the "scum of
all classes" has occurred. To answer this is undoubtedly speculative; however, an
answer--albeit an unpleasant one--does present itself. Given the existence of nationally
distinctive "internal colonies" of super-exploited proletarians within mature
capitalist societies, it is obvious that criminogenesis will not be randomly distributed
throughout the class structure of such societies. The outcome of this is that hoary
observation that certain nationalities come to be criminalized disproportionately even to
the point where they may predominate among the criminal population. While this reality
represents an indictment of capitalist social structure and its various national
chauvinisms, it is not an excuse for the startling transposition witnessed here. It is not
sufficient to explain a shift wherein the progressive, even vanguard potential of national
minorities is exchanged for a chimerical revolution of thieves, albeit thieves spawned by
that self-same class oppression. To look to the prisons for revolution when the assembly
plants and fields of capitalism are populated in equal disproportion by the same
nationalities found in those jails is to commit an error not of Marxism, but rather
one entirely outside of it. Unfortunately, as is always the case, an error of
revolutionary theory is never an error merely of theory.
REFERENCES
Habermas, Jurgen. 1975 Legitimation Crisis. Beacon: Boston.
O'Connor, James. 1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State. St. Martin's Press. N.Y.
Quinney, Richard. 1977 Class, State, and Crime. D. McKay Co. N.Y.
Taylor, Ian, Paul Walton, and Jock Young. 1973 The New Criminology. Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London.
Footnotes
1. Indeed, it is during the years around 1968 when many of the impressions upon which the new criminology are based were formed. Whether the errors of the perspective are due to a limited historical field of vision is a matter for subsequent discussion. Return